September 2004

No. 033

“The External - Internal Intelligence Units and Systems Process"

No two intelligence units and systems are the same. They could not possibly be because no two businesses or countries are the same. Each is unique to its own identity. Each identity has a different personality. Each personality has its own needs. Nevertheless, the process of intelligence never varies from the basics. In all modern intelligence units and systems the process is basically the same:

INTERNAL Basic Steps

1 - classify - relevant from the irrelevant = CEO for market intelligence selecting what needs to be known

2 - monitor - expeditiously = intelligence unit and system collecting this information

3 - filter - unique decision-making needs = transforming this collected information into finished products

4 - report - timely manner = placing these products in the CEO's hands, if market intelligence, or decision-makers for dissemination or not

EXTERNAL Basic Steps

1 - estimate - relevant from the irrelevant = CEO or decision-maker makes determination from the report what action is to be taken

2 - deploy - expeditiously = intelligence units and systems carrying out CEO or decision-maker's decision

3 - assess - unique decision-making needs = intelligence units and systems continue to monitor progress

4 - contain - timely manner = damage control

These are the series of basic steps required to produce up-to-date intelligence results no matter what the enterprise or what the issue addressed. There is no other known way to do it. Moreover, intelligence units and systems must complete all steps , in correct order, to achieve advantage. If the intelligence units and systems misses or stumbles on any one of these steps, then it takes a downfall.

Intelligent Agencies - Units and Systems Should NOT Work Together

History and experience teaches whenever, everyone talks about getting all intelligence units and systems combined into a single administration for budget restraints or forced cooperation across tribal boundaries - no one in history has been able to get it to work. The result - fatalities and failures - is 20-20 hindsight, same as before.

For example, look at our schools in the United States. Administrators think it is smart and they are wise to consolidate all schools into one big school and they pronounce their achieving success in efficiency and tax savings to the masses. But, history teaches just the opposite. Since the 1960's school boards in the United States have a dismal track record - of performance and costs. The government has not served as well the people with a failed social experiment that is thought less of today. History teaches it is easier to govern the masses in several small institutions instead of one large one. Yes, it costs more initially for more schools in reduced size; however, the costs savings in social problems and increased learning is magnified. It is interesting no one asks the teachers. Ever see a teacher on television or on a public panel - instead it is typically administrators who - many - have never been in a classroom.

Now let us relate it to intelligence units and systems. For example, look at intelligence agencies - intelligence units and systems. Governing bodies think it is smart and they are wise to consolidate all intelligence units and systems into one big organization and they pronounce their achieving success in efficiency and tax savings to the masses. But, history teaches just the opposite. Since the 1970's oversight committees in the United States have a dismal track record - of performance and costs. The government has not served as well the people with a failed social experiment by dismissing deep experienced personnel that is thought less of today. History teaches it is easier to govern intelligence units and systems in several small agencies instead of one large one. Yes, it costs more initially for more agencies in reduced size; however, the costs savings in security problems and increased success is magnified. It is interesting no one asks the field agents. Ever see a field agent on television or on a public panel - instead it is typically oversight committees who - in some instances - have never been in the field.

Thus, my point, we never seem to learn so we continue to repeat history and the mistakes of the past. It is also illuminating to recall in history what one head of state said about this subject, "I do not rule, 10,000 clerks do". The solution to the problem is compartmentization; the smaller, the more manageable. Compartments are protection; they limit the spread of damage.

Intelligence units and systems compartmentization does not mean economic compartmentization. Economic unification does not mean greater cost efficiency and savings. The principle of compartmentization was developed to an art at first by ship builders. For most of history, ship building was based on a single compartment. If the hull was penetrated at any point, the whole ship would go down. Today, ships are built with many sections, independent yet associated-connected, allowing if a hull is penetrated at any point, the ship remains afloat. The lesson is the more compartmentization, the smaller the compartments, the greater the chances for success.

How Do We Apply What Is Learned Here?

We might further ask: What do the retailers, police departments, and military have in common? All can become more effective in their decision-making with better intelligence provided in a timely manner.

Retailers who have become the largest players in history have done so by linking together through knowledge management systems (KMS) their check-out clerks, sales associates, floor managers, executives, and suppliers into one direct-loop continuous flow network. Retailers know immediately at the cash register when an item sells and the restocking order is generated instantly on this item to keep it on the shelves. This framework of knowledge management systems (KMS) is the most current thinking in logistics and value chain integration which provides a competitive edge.

Police departments know that collecting crime data and statistics as quickly as possible and reporting the information to the commanders and police officers in the field, give them an edge over criminals which in turn brings crime rates down. Each department or precinct deals with differences that are not necessarily uniform to all. There is advantage to small operational units as many police departments operate most effectively today.

Army knows this lesson well as special forces organization are the word of the day. The army knows that the faster the collection of information, analysis, and distribution to the decision-maker, the more effective the outcome on the battlefield. In battle, the advantage to the troops is that the more data, the more clearly the visual to the soldier in battle.

Industry and others have the opportunity to actually experience this sort of massive high speed data collection or more intricately now sophisticated data mining. From palm pilots to satellite phones, newer devices will have more memory and optimized screens for viewing. Faster downloads and reporting from the field will allow quicker reaction time. Immediate field reports will alert decision-teams all the way up through the chain-of-command for intelligence units and systems support, thus the intelligence element. The type of intelligence formed will enable the CEO or decision-maker to have the best information possible with the least chance of intercept.

We will continue to learn in more depth about these essential steps, which make-up the ingredients for success in the coming topics. This is the basis how the external and internal intelligence units and systems process for business works.

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